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THE IMPACT OF “GOING PRIVATE” ON 
CORPORATE STAKEHOLDERS 
Kent Greenfield*
Some scholars and public policy experts believe that concern for such 
stakeholders should not hold any relevance in the discussion of corporate 
law in general, and thus may be presumed to believe the same about a 
conversation about privatization.
 
As capital markets in the United States increasingly “go private,” there 
are a number of implications of this trend that have yet to be decisively 
analyzed. It is unclear how the retreat of companies from public capital 
markets will affect corporate governance, business competitiveness, and 
public oversight. It is also unclear how the privatization of corporate 
finance will affect non-shareholder stakeholders of firms, most centrally 
employees, communities, and the environment. 
1 In such a view, these concerns lie outside 
the realm of corporate governance law; they therefore should be of no great 
moment in the debate over whether public policy should respond to the 
strong “going private” trend. But for those of us corporate law scholars who 
assume that corporate governance should be analyzed in part according to 
its impacts on a broad range of stakeholders, one cannot decide how to 
respond to privatization without knowing how it affects those stakeholders.2
I suggest that, at least at a level of abstraction and as a matter of theory, 
there is little reason to be particularly skeptical of private companies, as 
compared to public companies, in their treatment of stakeholder interests. 
Private companies may be good citizens or bad citizens, good employers or 
bad employers. But this will be determined by what happens in the 
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 1. See, e.g., Hansmann, H., Kraakman R.H., The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 442 (Jan. 2001) (arguing that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies lie outside of corporate law); see George W. Dent, 
Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate 
Governance 25 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Paper 07-21, 2007) (advocating 
“shareholder primacy” as the best way to protect non-equity stakeholders and promote social 
responsibility), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995186. 
 2. See Silvia Ayuso, Miguel Angel Ariño, Roberto Garcia Castro & Miguel A. Rodriguez, 
Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the Approach to Corporate 
Governance (IESE Business School Working Paper, Paper No. 670, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982325; David K. Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate 
Personhood (Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
01–6, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141; David K. Millon, New Game Plan or 
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1001 (2000); David K. Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence 
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s 
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
1189 (1991); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law 
to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993). 
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governance and behaviors of particular companies, not by some theoretical 
predisposition. This essay is intended to be a brief introduction to several of 
the factors that weigh into the public/private comparison. 
I. TWO CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS 
Conventional wisdom regarding the going private phenomenon holds 
that it creates negative effects for non-shareholder stakeholders. Such a 
result occurs because the surge in going private transactions is part and 
parcel of the gladiatorial culture of Wall Street,3 where financial elites buy 
and sell entire companies for the gain of a tiny minority.4 Little concern is 
paid to anyone or anything other than the financial gain of those elites. 
Privatization firms buy up companies and take them out of the public 
markets, allowing them to be shielded from public scrutiny while they 
disembowel the company of its assets.5 The surge of privatization is 
reflective of a money culture that disregards interests of anyone or anything 
that cannot be translated into financial benefit to the firm. These include 
environmental conscientiousness,6 fairness to employees,7 and democratic 
norms of accountability.8
This conventional wisdom was echoed most recently by Republican 
presidential candidate Mike Huckabee, who commented on fellow 
candidate Mitt Romney’s experience in private equity, saying, “[I believe] 
most Americans want their next president to remind them of the guy they 
work with, not the guy who laid them off.”
 
9 In Europe, too, privatization is 
often the target of political leaders. Speaking about hedge funds and private 
equity groups in April 2005, Franz Müntefering, then chairman of the 
German Social Democratic Party and soon to be German vice-chancellor, 
contended: “Some financial investors don’t waste any thoughts on the 
people whose jobs they destroy.”10
But there is a competing conventional wisdom, and it directly conflicts 
with the first one. This narrative proposes that the only way to protect 
companies that want to take a long-term view, or that want to take into 
account interests that do not easily translate to financial income, is to 
 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Compare www.wallstreetgladiator.com, which expressly draws on this symbolism. 
 4. Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53 (2008). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Gail Collins, Op-Ed, The Battle of the Mitts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/opinion/12collins.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (citing Mike 
Huckabee’s Campaign Ad running in Michigan). 
 10. Steven J. Davis, et al., Private Equity and Employment 43 (World Econ. Forum, 
Globalization of Alternative Investments, Working Papers Volume I, 2008), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/df/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf. 
2008] The Impact of "Going Private" on Corporate Stakeholders 77 
privatize the company and insulate it from the short-term pressures of the 
capital markets.  The following prominent examples illustrate this 
competing version of conventional wisdom. 
In 1985, Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi’s) went through a leveraged buyout 
(LBO), which was one of the largest ever up to that date.11 The LBO took 
the company out of the public capital markets and allowed the descendents 
of Levi Strauss, the Haas family, to regain control.12 Among the reasons 
given by the family for the LBO was to enable the company to maintain its 
culture of community involvement and its commitment to social 
responsibility.13 This was more than mere lip service. Soon after the LBO, 
Levi’s announced uncommonly progressive standards for its contractors 
and refused to do business in China for over five years to protest China’s 
human rights record.14 The company also divested its pension funds from 
some companies doing business in South Africa, at a time when apartheid 
still existed.15 The LBO occurred because the company believed it had 
more room to act in a socially responsible way toward its multiple 
stakeholders if it were controlled by the Haas family, who has a long 
familial tradition of philanthropy,16
Another paradigmatic example of the social benefits of privatization is 
that of Malden Mills, a private apparel company in Massachusetts. Malden 
Mills, the manufacturer of Polertec fabric, suffered a devastating factory 
fire just before Christmas in 1995.
 than by a gross aggregation of public 
shareholders. 
17
                                                                                                                 
 11. Buyout Backed at Levi Strauss, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1985, at D11, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02EFD81338F932A05754C0A963948260. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. See also James Sterngold, Levi Strauss Stock Buyout Would Benefit Small Group, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at D2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9D0DE0D61339F932A15751C0A960958260&sec=&spon= (discussing Levi’s 
“growing reputation for social responsibility”). 
 14. William Beaver, Levi’s is leaving China – Levi Strauss, BUSINESS HORIZONS, Mar.–Apr. 
1995, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1038/is_n2_v38/ai_16793712; see also 
http://www.democracynow.org/1998/6/30/levi_strauss_returns_production_to_china. Even while 
publicly traded, the company had followed a number of acclaimed social responsibility policies, 
including an openness toward unionization and plant closing notification policies that were more 
protective of employees’ interests than what the law required. See CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATE 
NATION: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 
IT, at 188, 284 (1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines, 
reprinted in KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE GLOBAL MARKET PLACE  app. A, at 265 (2000). The argument for the LBO was, in part, 
that these efforts at social responsibility might become increasingly difficult if the company 
remained a public company and thus perhaps a target of hostile takeover attempts. 
 15. Timeline South Africa, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1069402.stm. 
 16. How Levi’s Trashed a Great American Brands, FORTUNE, Apr. 12, 1999, available at 
http://www.ninamunk.com/documents/HowLevisTrashedaGreatAmericanBrand.htm. 
 17. Steve Wulf & Tom Witkowski, The Glow From a Fire, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983916,00.html. 
 The president and principal owner, 
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Aaron Feuerstein, announced after the fire that the company would rebuild 
the factory (even though its competitors were moving off-shore) and 
maintain payroll in the meantime.18 He paid Christmas bonuses even though 
the factory was in ruins, and was held up as an example of excellent 
corporate citizenship.19
I have a responsibility to the worker, both blue-collar and white-collar. I 
have an equal responsibility to the community. It would have been 
unconscionable to put 3,000 people on the streets and deliver a deathblow 
to the cities of Lawrence and Methuen. Maybe on paper our company is 
worthless to Wall Street, but I can tell you it’s worth more.
 
Feuerstein articulated his rationale in stakeholder-centric terms, saying: 
20
Feuerstein became a minor celebrity for a time, sitting next to Hillary 
Clinton in the Senate gallery during former President Bill Clinton’s 1996 
State of the Union address.
 
21
I have sometimes used Levi’s and Malden Mills in my own scholarship 
and lectures as examples of socially responsible companies.
 
22
In fact, both the Levi’s and Malden Mills stories come with some 
limitations and important caveats, if offered as examples of successful 
corporate social responsibility.  Levi’s is regarded as a successful business, 
but it had a very tough decade in the 1990s.
 A common 
challenge to such examples is that such ethical, stakeholder-oriented 
behavior would be impossible for a public company. The notion implicit in 
this challenge is that privatization makes social responsibility more, not 
less, possible. 
23 Malden Mills has traveled an 
even tougher road: it went through bankruptcy and has been purchased by 
another company.24 Feuerstein is no longer the principal owner or CEO.25
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. David Lamb, Massachusetts Mill Town Gets Angel for Christmas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
1995, at A1. 
 20. BARBARA A. GLANZ, HANDLE WITH CARE: MOTIVATING AND RETAINING EMPLOYEES 
251 (2002). 
 21. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 198 (Yale 
University, 2000); see also Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers 
Challenge to Nation, Declaring, ‘Era of Big Government is Over’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at 
A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E2DB1F39F937A15752 
C0A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
 22. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–91 (2006) [hereinafter THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW]. 
 23. See Chris Reidy, In the Marketplace, They are no Longer Such a Great Fit, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1999, at A1; see also Greg Johnson, Blue Period, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at 
D1, available at  http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/06/business/fi-50688. 
 24. A Change at Malden Mills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at C8. 
 25. Id. 
 
These companies attempted, with different degrees of success, to take into 
account the interests of stakeholders in an industry—the apparel business—
that is extremely competitive and labor intensive. They may or may not be 
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the best examples of how companies can successfully take seriously the 
concerns of stakeholders. But the fact that they tried to do so at all, 
especially in such a competitive industry, is a testament to the conventional 
wisdom that such efforts are more likely when companies are private and 
can insulate themselves in some respects from the vagaries of the capital 
markets. 
Undoubtedly, it is odd to assert two conventional wisdoms about a 
given subject—especially two that run at cross-purposes. But both of these 
claims are prominent enough that they deserve to be called such. Also, both 
conventional wisdoms have some merit, at least at the theoretical level.26
II. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE COMPANIES 
  
On the one hand, private companies are often seen as havens for corporate 
raiders who care little about the experiences of the businesses’ non-equity 
stakeholders, and public markets are seen as a way for the public to have 
influence on the decision-making of firms. On the other hand, privatization 
may allow some companies the freedom from market pressures that make it 
more difficult to take a long-term, stakeholder view. Let us look more 
carefully at these competing stories about privatization. 
From the standpoint of non-shareholder stakeholders, there are key 
differences between public and private companies. It is initially unclear, 
however, whether there is reason to believe that one form or the other is 
likely to lead to corporate governance that is more beneficial to all investors 
in the firm. To find out, it is necessary to consider some major differences: 
time horizon, disclosure, concentration of equity ownership, and autonomy 
of management. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. I should hasten to add that perhaps the existence of these two conflicting narratives can be 
best explained by a study of the history of privatization rather than the theory of it.  Both the 
Levi’s and the Malden Mills experiences can be explained in major part by a dedication of the 
Jewish owners to seeing the business as an extension of their own moral obligations. See SINGER, 
supra note 21, at 200; SCHOENBERGER, supra note 14, at 36. The private nature of both firms 
gave them the freedom to act with less attention to the short-term concerns of the capital market. 
But both companies struggled to keep their vision in place in part because of the difficulties posed 
by other markets, most prominently the product market. The recent going private trend does not in 
any way seem motivated by social concerns. Private equity firms are not as a rule dominated by 
families who want to use the companies they purchase to act out moral obligations, but by high 
net worth investors that see the purchased companies as mechanisms for building wealth, usually 
in a short time frame. See, e.g., Michael Alles, Private Equity Funds: Champions of Governance 
and Disclosure?, 4 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, 217, 220 (2007) (“[P]rivate investors 
in private equity funds care only about making money.”), available at http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/jdg/journal/v4/n4/full/2050068a.html. 
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A. TIME HORIZON 
Private companies are not limited by the short-term vision said to 
plague public markets.27 Share turnover in publicly-traded, Fortune 500 
companies is very high—over 100% per year—and is even higher for 
smaller companies.28 Reporting requirements impose quarter-by-quarter 
reporting, which requires companies to track the short term and encourages 
markets to reflect short-term interests.29 A recent study of chief financial 
officers revealed that a significant majority of them would voluntarily make 
decisions costly to the firm in the long-term in order to meet quarterly Wall 
Street projections.30 No one advocates for short-term management, but 
public markets make it more likely to occur.31
One example of short-term thinking that hurts employees is the so-
called “7 percent rule,” which is the Wall Street notion that one way to 
achieve a short-term bump in stock price—usually the aforementioned 
7%—is to announce lay-offs.
 
32 Economic studies indicate that no such 
benefit continues over the long term.33 Nevertheless, the frequency of this 
short-term bump in stock prices has ensured that the “7% rule” is often a 
managerial heuristic.34
On the other hand, managers of public companies are not totally driven 
toward short-term gains. Managers of public companies often have a longer 
time horizon than shareholders, and the business judgment rule gives those 
managers sufficient leeway to manage with an eye toward at least the 
medium term.
 So if short-term management hurts stakeholders and 
long-term management benefits stakeholders, privatization may be a 
positive trend for stakeholders because it frees managers to manage with a 
longer time horizon and without the need for immediate accountability in 
the form of profits. 
35 Privatization, in contrast, is often done in order to perform 
a quick-flip of the target company, often within a year or two.36 When 
management takes such a short time horizon, stakeholders with a long-term 
horizon (e.g., employees, communities, and those concerned with the 
environment) tend to lose out.37
                                                                                                                 
 27. Mark Goyder, Ownership and Sustainability – Are Listed Companies More Responsible, 
ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, July 14, 2008, at 46–49. 
 28. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED 
OVER INDUSTRY 277–78 (2007). 
 29. Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49. 
 30. MITCHELL, supra note 28, at 277–78. 
 31. Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49. 
 32. For a more in-depth description of the 7% rule, see Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming 
Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12–13 (2008). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 13–14. 
 36. See SEIU, BEHIND THE BUYOUTS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE EQUITY 14 (Apr. 
2007); see generally Oesterle, supra note 4 (discussing the short term horizon of PE firms). 
 Perhaps the question of whether 
 37. See Oesterle, supra note 4. 
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privatization is a good thing for non-equity stakeholders turns on an 
empirical judgment on the number of companies taken private only to be 
flipped. According to the World Economic Forum, while leveraged buyouts 
using private funds are quicker to flip than those using public funds, only 
12% of privately-funded LBOs go public or are re-sold within two years, 
and less than 3% do so within twelve months.38
When all is said and done, perhaps what can be said is that in private 
firms, it is more possible for managers to manage for the long term, even if 
not more likely. To the extent that, in the long term, stakeholder interests 
and shareholder interests in fact coalesce,
 At face value, this data 
supports the notion that privatization would not have a large impact on the 
time horizon of management, at least with regard to stakeholders. 
39 private companies may at least 
have more freedom to bring that coalescence about. Moreover, if 
stakeholder-oriented firms allocate surplus differently, a longer time 
horizon might matter, because more time often allows reciprocal benefits of 
stakeholder management to accrue.40 For example, studies show that when 
employees believe their employers treat them fairly, employees are more 
loyal and obey company rules more.41
This theory must include a handful of caveats. First, to the extent that 
long-term interests of shareholders and other stakeholders do not 
necessarily coalesce, the lengthened time horizon will not be a significant 
benefit to privatization. Second, the long term may be too far away to make 
such coalescence real. As Keynes would say, in the long term we are all 
dead.
 This reciprocity is a natural human 
reaction and does not develop overnight. So, when stakeholder governance 
creates good feelings on the part of employees and other stakeholders, a 
longer time horizon would allow the benefits gained from those good 
feelings to accrue. 
42
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Davis, supra note 10. 
 39. See Oesterle, supra note 4. 
 40. For a more robust analysis of reciprocal benefits in the workplace and in corporate 
governance, see THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 22, at 158–85. 
 41. For a more in-depth analysis of this effect within companies, see Kent Greenfield, Using 
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 627–40 (2002). 
 42. JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923). 
 If that is true, then perhaps what really matters is not long-term 
management, but the current allocation of corporate surplus (i.e., whether 
private companies will allocate less of the corporate surplus to equity and 
more to communities and employees). While being a private company 
might make such an allocation more possible if equity and management 
want it to occur, there is nothing in the structure of the governance of 
private companies that makes it occur on its own accord. 
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B. DISCLOSURE 
One of the oft-mentioned distinctions between private and public firms 
is the fact that private companies can go “dark” and can operate without 
disclosing certain kinds of information to the public.43 Information that can 
be hidden from the public can include specifics of executive compensation, 
financial structure, and plans for the future.44 To the extent that stakeholders 
use the data in their labor negotiations, consumer purchasing habits, or 
shareholder activism to pressure companies to act differently, the loss of 
this information to the public is a key difference between public and private 
firms. One might see the obligation of disclosure as one part of the implicit 
social contract between business and a democratic society. That is, 
disclosure might be seen as a part of the set of requirements imposed by the 
polity on the corporate form in exchange for the power to aggregate 
wealth.45
There are several indications that these differences in disclosure do not 
have much of an impact on stakeholders. First, according to Robert Bartlett, 
a significant and growing percentage of private companies voluntarily 
subject themselves to disclosure obligations, including those of Sarbanes-
Oxley.
 To the extent that private firms are less subject to that democratic 
check, they may take into account the interests of the polity less often than 
public firms. 
46 Perhaps disclosure is a bonding mechanism for management to 
reassure investors, and even the public at large.47
                                                                                                                 
 43. For an excellent analysis of the effects of privatization on disclosure, see Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
Firms’ Going Private Transactions,  76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088830. 
 44. See Oesterle, supra note 4. 
 45. Andre Kah Hin Khor, Social Contract Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Corporate Social 
and Environmental Disclosure Policies: Constructing a Theoretical Framework (unpublished 
essay), Nottingham Univ. Bus. Sch. available at http://www.ibe.org.uk/runner-up%20essay%20-
%20undergrad%20category.pdf. 
 46. See Bartlett, supra note 43. 
 47. Irene Karamanou & George P. Nishiotis, Disclosure vs. Legal Bonding: Can Increased 
Disclosure Substitute for Cross-Listing?, at 4 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.hec.unil.ch/urccf/seminar/IAS%20vs%20CL.pdf (citing research suggesting that 
bonding benefits are associated with increased disclosure); Richard Lambert, Christian Leuz & 
Robert E. Verrecchia, Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital, at 16 (Aug. 
2006), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0620.pdf (“As more public 
information is generated, the assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows goes down, and the 
discount of price relative to the expected cash flow declines.”); see generally David Easley & 
Maureen O’Hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 1553, 1554–1583 (2004); Jeffrey 
Ng, The Effect of Information Quality on Liquidity Risk, (July 21, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097382. 
 In any event, privatization 
is increasingly done not to avoid financial disclosure but for other reasons. 
Something other than disclosure obligations is driving companies to 
privatize. 
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The second reason why differences in disclosure may nevertheless be 
immaterial to stakeholders is that typical financial disclosure provides only 
limited benefits to non-equity stakeholders. Materiality to shareholders does 
not equal materiality to employees or other stakeholders, and the disclosure 
of financial data may reveal little of importance to those interests. For 
example, financial disclosure may mean little to employees who worry 
about whether the company is going to relocate their particular factory 
overseas. The decision may not be material to the typical shareholder, in 
that it would not have a reasonable likelihood of affecting the shareholder’s 
decision to buy or sell the stock, especially if the company is large and the 
factory relatively small in comparison to the company’s business as a 
whole. But such a decision would be absolutely crucial to the employees 
who are employed in the factory. So the requirement that companies 
disclose material financial information may simply be neither here nor there 
to most employees. 
C. CONCENTRATION OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
Private companies, by definition, have more concentrated equity 
ownership.48 To some degree, this concentration makes companies appear 
to be more like European companies, which are typically held less widely 
than U.S. companies.49 In Europe, blocks of shares are owned by banks or 
other institutions,50 and thus their shares are also typically less liquid than 
those of U.S. public firms. This correlates with a greater concern for non-
equity stakeholders, which is much more of a mainstream idea in European 
managerial circles compared to the United States.51
                                                                                                                 
 48. See generally Oesterle, supra note 4 (referring to the requirement that a company that goes 
private has less than 300 shareholders). 
 49. See THOMAS CLARKE & MARIE DELA RAMA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 9 (2008), available at http://www.ccg.uts.edu.au/PDF/fundamentals_of_cg.pdf. 
(“Though there are many widely held companies in Western Europe, an analysis of ownership 
structure . . . demonstrate[s] that ownership concentration is more extensive.”). 
 50. See also Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate 
Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 604 (2000) (showing tables of ownership concentration across 
countries). 
 51. See Torsten Sewing, Governance: Germany - Driving Through Governance Reform, 
ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, Dec. 16, 2007, at 47; see also John Russell, Governance: F&C 
Investments - Governance Worth Investing In, ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, June 16, 2008 at 41–42; 
Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49. 
 This greater concern for 
stakeholders may spring from a more robust social contract between 
businesses and the European polity, or it may be derived from a greater 
identification between the equity holders and the companies, which in turn 
imposes reputational constraints on the behavior of the company that would 
not exist if the equity were held in a more diffuse way. Or, it might spring 
from the fact that the lower liquidity means that the equity holders are more 
likely to be physically located in or near the facilities of the companies in 
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question, so that the behavior of the companies in question are more likely 
to affect the equity holders themselves. Moreover, this concern for 
employees in particular is woven into the fabric of corporate governance in 
Europe; the requirement that employees be represented on the company 
board, known as “co-determination,” exists in 18 of the 25 European Union 
nations.52
On the other hand, more concentrated equity ownership means that 
ownership is bound to be more idiosyncratic. With concentrated equity 
ownership, such ownership can either be socially responsible like Aaron 
Feuerstein or be his morally bankrupt mirror image. As compared to public 
market investors, private equity investors are as likely to be more profit-
oriented as less profit-oriented.
 
The comparison between European publicly-traded companies and U.S. 
privately-held companies may therefore be helpful. Lower liquidity and 
greater concentration of ownership lead to a greater identification between 
the holders of equity and the company itself. It also may mean that the 
holders of the equity are more likely to be physically located near company 
facilities. To the extent these parallels hold true—and it is an empirical 
question whether they do—one should not be surprised if it is indeed the 
case that private firms in the U.S. consider themselves freer than public 
companies to take into account the interests of stakeholders. 
53 According to Dale Oesterle, private firms 
bear this out, and are more focused on the returns of equity ownership than 
are public firms.54
There is a different side of the story. Public markets, including capital 
markets, have all kinds of players in them.
 
55 Not all players in the capital 
markets model themselves after gladiators; some shareholders use their 
equity ownership to advance other purposes and ideals. Shareholders 
include unions, public employee pension funds, church groups, and law 
professors. Shareholders can influence the market and can engage in 
shareholder activism on anything from the use of napalm to force-feeding 
geese.56
Separation of ownership and control may counterbalance the restraints 
of the public market, however. With public companies, the “separation of 
 
                                                                                                                 
 52. REBECCA PAGE, CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY – A BEGINNERS’ GUIDE 31 (2006). 
 53. See Donald Jay Korn, Working the Private Equity Circuit, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1, 
1998, http://www.allbusiness.com/business-finance/equity-funding-private-equity/707232-1.html. 
(Generally “private equity investors are extremely profit-oriented, there are exceptions—
especially local groups that have alternative goals.”). 
 54. See Oesterle, supra note 4. 
 55. See CTR. FOR CAPITAL FLOW ANALYSIS, CAPITAL MARKET PLAYERS: INVESTORS, 
ISSUERS, AND INTERMEDIARIES, available at http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/market-
sectors/market-players.html. 
 56. See Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (shareholder sued 
company to include shareholder’s proposal regarding force-feeding geese for production of foie 
gras); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. S.E.C., 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (SEC did not require Dow 
Chemical to include a shareholder proposal to limit Dow’s sales of napalm in proxy statement). 
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ownership and control” means that equity holders may not identify with, or 
be identified with, the activities of the companies whose stock they own.57 
There is thus a loss of reputational constraint on the behavior of public 
firms.58 It is possible that, with private companies, they will be identified 
with their dominant equity investors simply by reputation. For example, the 
fact that the Haas family saw Levi’s as their company meant that they 
projected their family values onto the company culture, to the benefit of the 
company’s stakeholders.59
One other effect of concentrated equity ownership deserves mention. 
As equity ownership becomes more concentrated, it is typical for 
companies to rely on debt rather than equity financing, which leads to a 
higher debt-to-equity ratio.
 
60 This higher leverage may have effects on non-
shareholder stakeholders. It is a financial truism that leverage leads to 
greater volatility in return on equity.61 To the extent that such volatility 
leads to riskier decisions on the part of management (because equity holders 
enjoy a disproportionate benefit from risky decisions that pay off, and their 
downside risk is limited because of limited liability), high leverage will be a 
negative for those stakeholders that value stability rather than risk.62 In 
other words, to the extent private firms are highly leveraged, they will have 
greater incentives to make riskier decisions with the possibility of high 
payoffs.63 This will be especially true if the equity of the specific private 
company is held in a private equity firm that has a number of such 
companies in a diversified portfolio, because the risk is hedged.64 From the 
standpoint of the private equity firm, the risk of any particular company 
failing because of its risky decisions is more than made up for by the 
potential upside to equity in the other companies.65 From the standpoint of 
the stakeholders of the individual firms, who are not able to diversify away 
the downside risk of their company’s failure, the riskier decisions brought 
about by high leverage are a worry.66
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Beaver, supra note 14. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Güner Gürsoy and Kürşat Aydoğan, Equity Ownership Structure, Risk-Taking and 
Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Turkish Companies, Bilkent University, Ankara, 
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 62. Gürsoy & Aydoğan, supra note 60. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Efficient Markets and the Portfolio Theorem, http://arnoldkling.com/econ/saving/ 
portfol.html (last visisted Nov. 4, 2008). 
 65. Id. 
 66. For a related point, see generally Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 
CASE. W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), for a discussion of the divergent interests of  non-
shareholder stakeholders and shareholders with regards to how leveraged a company should be. 
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D. AUTONOMY OF MANAGEMENT 
If management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use 
their autonomy to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and 
other stakeholders.67 Discretion can mean that more of the corporate surplus 
goes to employees and other stakeholders, because managers can use their 
own sense of fairness and “just dessert” as a guide in allocating the 
accumulated corporate surplus and can be freed from a strict fiduciary 
obligation to maximize returns to shareholders.68 This was the ostensible 
argument behind the stakeholder statutes adopted during the 1980s: by 
giving more autonomy to managers, non-equity stakeholders would 
benefit.69 Some research bolsters the argument that this effect has been one 
of the by-products of those stakeholder statutes.70
With regard to the public/private company debate, one would assume 
that management is less autonomous in a public company because the 
company faces capital market discipline
 
71 and the managers occasionally 
face legal discipline if they do not pay close attention to the well-being of 
shareholders.72 In private companies, there is less capital market pressure 
and thus the potential for more managerial autonomy.73
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 And assuming the 
benevolence of private company management, this autonomy will give it 
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more flexibility to allocate a greater portion of the corporate surplus to non-
equity stakeholders. 
But this does not ring true with the current privatization trends. Private 
equity firms do not appear to follow in the Aaron Feuerstein or Haas family 
models. As Dale Oesterle has written, private equity firms today are even 
more oriented toward the prerogatives of equity than are public firms.74
Moreover, the notion that managers have more autonomy in private 
firms may simply be incorrect. Owners of private-company equity may be 
more involved and engaged in the management of private firms.
 If 
this is right, then the autonomy of private-firm management might be used 
not for the benefit of stakeholders, but for the benefit of the managers 
themselves and their cohort of equity owners. 
75 They 
may not take too kindly to management allocating corporate wealth they 
believe is theirs to other stakeholders. Ironically, management of public 
firms may be better able to use their own moral sensibilities as a guide than 
the management of private firms. The equity of public companies is 
typically held by gross aggregations of shareholders, and shareholders have 
difficulty coordinating their monitoring efforts.76 Management is therefore 
insulated from oversight because of agency costs.77 Concentrated 
ownership, more of the norm in private companies, makes it easier for 
shareholders to monitor management and more difficult for management to 
“go off the reservation” and act in ways that benefit stakeholders at the 
expense of shareholders.78
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Obviously, this discussion is merely a first cut at the various ways in 
which private companies may be better or worse for stakeholders than 
public companies. There certainly are other material characteristics of 
private firms that I have not identified here. But given this first view, it does 
not appear that privatization is necessarily positive or negative for 
stakeholders. There may be somewhat more freedom for private firms to 
operate with a view toward stakeholder interests, but the impact is likely to 
be marginal. And that freedom could cut the other way, giving private firms 
the ability to insulate themselves from stakeholder interests and public 
oversight, making them even more profit-oriented and less concerned about 
the public interest. 
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To protect stakeholders, assistance should come from legal reforms 
such as adjustments in fiduciary duty requirements and the makeup of 
corporations’ decision-making bodies. These reforms should be applied to 
both publicly-traded and privately-financed firms. The benefits to 
stakeholders arising organically from privatization, if they exist at all, are 
likely to be marginal. If we are convinced that stakeholders deserve some 
additional protection, then we should look outside of corporate governance 
or seek to weave a concern for their interests into the very fabric of the firm 
itself.79
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